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Abstract
We consider the impact of diplomatic intervention in civil wars on international trade.
Using a large data set over the period 1948-2005, we obtain two striking results: (i) diplo-
matic intervention has a positive effect on trade for the country in which the civil war
occurs (target country); and (ii) bilateral trade between the target and intervening coun-
try does not increase more than trade between the target country and the other countries.
We argue that intervention induces an enhancement of trade-promoting capital in the
target country and show that diplomatic intervention has a positive effect on institutional
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11 Introduction
A third of world countries has experienced civil conﬂict since the end of World War II. Civil
war dramatically alters infrastructures, human capital and institutions. Civil war also has
deep and persistent negative effect on international trade, up to (at least) 20 years after the
end of conﬂict (Martin et al., 2008a). The end of war constitutes a new starting point for the
building of a peaceful society through the reconstruction of infrastructures, human capital
and institutions. This great challenge faced by countries after conﬂict needs to be analyzed
in considering the role played by all the parts involved in the rebuilding. A crucial issue is the
role and consequences of third party intervention in civil war.
We exploit a new dataset on diplomatic intervention in civil war to examine the effect of
intervention on trade over the post World War II period (1948-2005). The context of civil war
is of particular interest because it is a period of great political instability and the effect of
diplomacy on local politics is potentially huge. We ﬁnd that third party diplomatic interven-
tion increases trade despite the persistent global decrease in trade observed in post-conﬂict
countries. The positive effect of diplomatic intervention on trade has two possible explana-
tions. The ﬁrst is that following intervention, the intervener and the target countries may
introduce some formal trade preferences. The intervener may use its intervention to exercise
certain power and inﬂuence to promote bilateral trade. This explanation will be supported if
tradebetweenintervenerandtargetcountrygrowsmorethantradebetweenthetargetcoun-
try and the other world countries. The second is that intervention may decrease transaction
coststhroughenhancementofsometrade-promotingcapitalsuchasinstitutions, infrastruc-
ture rebuilding, trust,... This explanation will be strengthened if the increase in trade with the
intervener is the same as the increase in trade with all the other countries.
Our main result are that: (i) diplomatic intervention has a positive effect on global trade
for the country that experienced the civil war; and (ii) bilateral trade between the target and
intervenercountrydoesnotincreasemorethantradebetweenthetargetandothercountries.
Our conclusions on the effect of diplomatic intervention on trade reinforce the idea of an
enhancement of trade-promoting capital after a diplomatic intervention. Through an event-
studyanalysis, weshowthataftercivilwar, theincreaseinqualityofinstitutionsforcountries
that experienced intervention is higher than for countries that did not.
To our knowledge, few studies have tackled the effect of third party intervention on inter-
national trade. Berger et al. (2009) focus on US trade patterns after CIA interventions during
2theColdWar. TheyshowthattheshareofimportsofthetargetcountryfromtheUSincreases,
but ﬁnd no effect on exports from the target country to the US. They argue that the increased
importation of the target country reﬂects a trade diversion and is due to an increase in the
power and inﬂuence arising from CIA intervention. The authors claim that these effects do
not stem from decreased transaction costs. There are also few studies dealing with the effect
of intervention on institutions. Easterly et al. (2008) provide an estimate of the effect of CIA
interventions during the Cold war on levels of democracy. They show that superpower inter-
ventionsarefollowedbysigniﬁcantdeclinesindemocracy. Ourresultsareverydifferentfrom
these two articles as we focus on diplomatic interventions which, by nature, differ from CIA
interventions.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on the aftermath of civil war. A strand of
the political science literature contributes to our understanding about the roots of conﬂict
(Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoefﬂer, 2004) and there is a growing strand that fo-
cuses on the effects of civil war (Martin et al., 2008a) and its aftermath (Fosu and Collier,
2005; Chen et al., 2007). Among other consequences, institutions are dramatically affected
by civil war. Civil conﬂict induces a disorganization or total collapse of national institutions.
In reviewing the recent literature on the role of institutions for growth, Blattman and Miguel
(2009) write that ‘the social and institutional legacies of conﬂict are arguably the most impor-
tant but least understood of all war impacts’. In this paper, we argue that interveners improve
the institutional quality in the target country.
Theremainderofourpaperisstructuredasfollows. Section2describesthedataondiplo-
maticinterventionandtrade. Section3explainstheestimationprocedure. Section4presents
ourempirical resultsregardingthe effect of diplomatic intervention. Section5 focuses on en-
dogeneity issues. Section 6 is dedicated to the institutional channel and Section 7 concludes.
2 Data on diplomatic intervention and trade
We use the database in Regan (2002), in which diplomatic intervention is either mediation
or a forum. Mediation is a non-coercive, non-violent, and, ultimately, non-binding form
of intervention. The deﬁnition of mediation used to build this database is borrowed from
Bercovitch and Wille (1991) that mediation is ‘a process of conﬂict management where dis-
putants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or
organization to settle their conﬂict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical
3force or invoking the authority of the law’. An international forum is a formally organized
meeting of the representatives from several countries whose outcome, in this case, is also
non-binding. In our sample, 98% of diplomatic interventions are initiated by a third party
and 2% are requested by at least one of the warring parties. From 1948 to 2005, there have
been119diplomaticinterventionsincivilwars. Figure1showsthattheleastdevelopedcoun-
tries where civil wars are frequent, are often the targets of diplomatic interventions (black
coloured). Figure 2 depicts the countries that intervened in civil conﬂict (grey coloured). The
countries with the most developed economies are the most frequent interveners. At the top
of the list, the US launched 26 diplomatic interventions over the period.
Figure 1: Target countries
4Figure 2: Interveners
For civil war, we use Correlates Of War data proposed by Gleditsch (2004) and completed
by Regan (2002) which takes account of civil wars with less than 1,000 deaths per year.1 For
theusualgravityvariablesweusevarioussources. WeuseInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)
Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) data augmented by Martin et al. (2008b) for the aggre-
gated trade variables. The Regional Trade Agreements data comes from Vicard (2009), the
Currency Union data from Jose de Sousa2 and gross domestic product (GDP) from the World
Bank (World Development Indicator) completed by Barbieri (2002).
1The dataset contained in Regan (2002) records all the interventions in conﬂicts with more than 200 deaths
per year.
2http://jdesousa.univ.free.fr/data.htm
53 Speciﬁcation and estimation procedure
Inordertoestimatetheeffectofdiplomaticinterventionontrade,weusethegravityequation
formulation and the estimation procedure proposed by Baier and Bergstrand (2009). We ﬁrst
explain why we choosed these procedure. Following Head and Ries (2009), the vast majority
of empirical and theoretical formulations of the gravity equation can be summarized in the






Different theoretical foundations occur in the literature (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004;




jt represent the respective individual
attributes of the exporter i and of the importer j at time t, Gt is a year speciﬁc factor and ϕijt
represents bilateral determinants. We specify the log of the bilateral term ϕijt as:
lnϕijt = Dijt + εijt, (2)
whereDijt representstheobservedandεijt theunobservedbilateraltradecostdeterminants.
Taking the logarithm of equation (1) and substituting (2) into the new equation and deﬁning











tries, GDPit and GDPjt. This means that the standard gravity equation omits ‘multilateral re-
sistance terms’ (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Feenstra, 2004). Most applications of the
gravity equation concentrate on the variations in bilateral trade, that is Dijt, and use ﬁxed
effects for each exporter-year and importer-year in order to eliminate the two monadic de-
terminants in (3).
Ourobjectiveistodeterminewhetheradiplomaticinterventioninducesachangeintrade
between intervener and target countries and whether this induces a change in trade between
the target country and all its trading partners. Hence, we concentrate on both the monadic
anddyadicdeterminantsoftrade. Toourknowledge,theonlytheoreticallygroundedmethod
that is appropriate for this objective is the method proposed in Baier and Bergstrand (2009)
which enables estimation of bilateral trade for a large number of countries, over a long pe-
riod, without elimination of the monadic determinants. They use Taylor expansions around
symmetric trade costs to derive a linear econometrically implementable equation. Following
6their notations, Tijt is the bilateral trade cost, σ the elasticity of substitution of consumers’
preferences and the equation of interest is:
ln(Xijt) = β0t + ln(GDPit) + ln(GDPjt)   (σ   1)lnTijt + (σ   1)MRTijt + ρt + εijt, (4)


















The multilateral resistance term, MRTijt, is an exogenous variable that takes account of mul-
tilateral price effects in the estimation. We will estimate equation (4) and focus on the dyadic
effectandmonadiceffectsofdiplomaticinterventions. Theﬁrstdeterminantweconsidercan
be captured by a dyadic dummy variable, INTbil
ijt which is 1 only if one of the two countries i
and j intervenes in the other country at time t. The second determinant can be captured by
monadic dummies, INTXG
it and INTMG
jt which are 1 only if i and j respectively were the tar-
get of an intervention at time t. In the rest of the paper, we use the lags of these dummies and
when our interestis not in distinguishing exports and imports, the monadic effects areaggre-
gated into a single variable INTGijt. This dummy variable is 1 if either i or j experienced an
intervention at time t.
4 The effect of diplomatic intervention on trade
In this section we present our main results. We focus ﬁrst on the effects of diplomatic inter-
vention on target country trade ﬂows without distinguishing between imports and exports.
After some robustness checks, we estimate the effect on imports and exports separately.
4.1 The effect of diplomatic intervention on global trade
WeusethemethodologyinBaier and Bergstrand(2009)describedabove. Wespecifythetrade




   GINT G
ijt     bilINT bil
ijt     CCONTROLijt + µij
)
, (6)
where µij is a country pair ﬁxed effect and INT G
ijt and INT bil
ijt are two lagged dummy
vectors (from t   k to t). The component INTG
ijt d is 1 only if country i or j experienced
an intervention at time t   d. It measures a global effect of intervention, i.e. the effect of
7interventions on the patterns of trade of all the partners of the target country. INT bil
ijt is also
a vector of the lagged dummies. Its component INTbil
ijt d is 1 only if j intervened in i or i
intervened inj at time t d. It measures the effect of intervention on the intensity of bilateral
tradebetweentheintervenerandthetargetcountry. CONTROLijt isavectorofthecontrol
variables. It includes RTAijt, a dummy set to 1 if countries i and j are are members of the
same Regional Trade Agreement at time t and CUijt, a dummy set to 1 if countries i and j are
members of a common Currency Union at time t. It also includes a vector of lagged dummies
indicatingtheendofconﬂictincountryj ori(EndWarijt = (EndWarijt k,...,EndWarijt)).
EndWarijt k is a dummy and is set to 1 only if country i or country j came out of the war k
years before time t. Substituting this speciﬁcation into (4), we write our main equation of
interest:
ln(Xijt) = β0t + ln(GDPit) + ln(GDPjt) + GINT G
ijt + bilINT bil
ijt (7)
+CCONTROLijt + MRMRijt + µij + ρt + εijt,





, I = (1   σ)   I for I = G,bil,C. The term MRijt comprises multilat-
eral terms for all the explanatory variables (excepted the GDP).3 µij is a dyadic ﬁxed effect, ρt
a time dummy, and εijt is the random error term. All MR terms are deﬁned similar to formula
(5).
Our main speciﬁcation includes 442,810 observations (dyads) from 1948 to 2005, and
11,054diplomaticinterventions(2.5%),i.e. 119differentdiplomaticinterventions(foracom-
plete list, see Table 3 in Appendix). We choose to study the persistence of the intervention
effect over a long time scale, and use dummies lagged up to 15 years. Our regression contains
a large number of lagged variables (from 1 to k = 15 years). For ease of reading, we present
ourresultsingraphicalratherthantabularform.4 Allestimatedcoefﬁcientsfortheusualvari-
ables in the gravity equation are very similar to the results in the literature. The coefﬁcients
are smoothed by a one year window around the year of interest.
Figure 3 shows (the black squares) the effect of the end of civil war on trade (imports +
exports) with a 10% conﬁdence interval. The effect is persistent for 15 years after the end
of the conﬂict and trade is still 15% lower than its natural level. The line with black circles
is the effect of diplomatic intervention on the trade of the target countries (  G). The effect





4Our main regression contains 79 variables and all multilateral resistance terms joined. This gives us 158 vari-
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Figure 3: The impact of diplomatic intervention and civil war on trade
of diplomatic intervention is large and persistent up to 15 years after the end of civil war.
The coefﬁcient shows a nearly 20% increase in trade above its natural level. This shows that
diplomatic intervention compensates (at least partially) for the negative effect of the end of
conﬂict. Wedonot plotthe effectof interventiononbilateraltrade(betweentargetand inter-
vener countries) because none of the estimated coefﬁcients in the vector   bil is signiﬁcant.
It seems that diplomatic intervention does not induce a privileged trading relationship be-
tween intervener and target countries. In other words, trade between these countries does
not grow more than trade between the target country and its other partners. This result does
not support the exertion of bilateral inﬂuence by the intervener but supports the transaction
costs reduction effect of diplomatic intervention.
4.2 Robustness checks
In this section, we check whether our results regarding diplomatic intervention are robust to
other control variables. We include other types of intervention (economic or military) and
9interventions by the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO). We also
check the robustness of our result to the introduction of level of development of the inter-
vener, and the intensity of the conﬂict.
Other types of intervention: Our main results are unaffected when we introduce two vectors
of dummies (with lags) to take into account economic and military interventions. Military
intervention refers to intervention using military troops, naval forces, equipment or aid, in-
telligence or advisors, air support, or military sanctions.
United Nations and NGO interventions: Our main results are also unaffected when we intro-
duce United Nations and NGO interventions.5 Data on NGO interventions are from Regan
(2002) and include diplomatic intervention by the Organization of African Unity, the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Drought and Development and the Catholic Church Economic
Community Of West African States.
Intervener’slevelofeconomicdevelopment: Ourmainresultsholdevenforintervenersoutside
OECD. To show this result, we split the sample into two groups. The ﬁrst includes interven-
ers belonging to the OECD group (over 112,000 observations) and the second group includes
interveners that do not belong to the OECD (332,000 observations). The effect of diplomatic
interventiononthetradeofthetargetcountry(  G)isstillpositive6 andtheeffectofinterven-
tion on bilateral trade is still non-signiﬁcant.
Intensity of conﬂict: Finally, our main results hold for conﬂicts with high and low intensities.7
4.3 Imports and exports
Nextwedistinguishtheeffectofinterventionon(Figure4)andexports(Figure5). Wewantto
check whether the effect of the intervention differs depending on the type of trade ﬂows. We
decomposeINT bil
ijt andINT G




ijt. The component INTMbil
ijt d of INTMbil
ijt is a dummy that is equal to 1 only
if country i intervened in country j at time t   d. It captures the effect of a diplomatic inter-
vention on imports by the target country (j) from the intervener (i). Similarly, component
5Interpreting NGO, military and economic intervention effects is difﬁcult. For the ﬁrst coefﬁcients we observe
a negative effect (signiﬁcant or not) and for the last coefﬁcients a positive effect (for the last 3 years only at mean).
6 For the ﬁrst group, the coefﬁcient is negative for the ﬁrst two years, but non-signiﬁcant, while in the main
regression it was negative and signiﬁcant.
7We introduce a dummy that controls for the intensity of conﬂict. It is 1 when the number of deaths per year




ijt is a dummy that is equal to 1 only if country j intervened in country
i at time t   d. It captures the effect of diplomatic intervention on exports from the target
(i) to the intervener country (j). INT G





it is a dummy that is equal to 1 only if country i experienced
an intervention at time t   d. It captures the effect of diplomatic intervention on the imports
of the target country (j) from all its partners. Similarly, component INTMG
jt d of INTMG
jt
is a dummy that is equal to 1 only if country j experienced an intervention at time t   d. It
captures the effect of diplomatic intervention on the exports of the target country (i) to all its
trade partners. We redeﬁne the trade barrier terms as follows:
Tijt = exp

    GXINTXG
it     GMINTMG
jt     bilXINTXbil
ijt
   bilMINTMbil
ijt     CCONTROLijt

. (8)
Notice that Tijt is not necessarily equal to Tijt. We use the deﬁnitions above to estimate the
following equation:
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MRMRijt + µij + ρt + εijt





, I = (1   σ)   I for I = G,bil,C. The term MRijtcomprises the
multilateral terms for all the explanatory variables (excepted GDP).8
The effect of diplomatic intervention on imports: similar to the effects on global trade, diplo-
matic intervention has no signiﬁcant effect on the imports of the target country from the
intervener (  bilM is non-signiﬁcant). Figure 4 plots the estimated effect of interventions on
the imports of the target country (  GM). We still ﬁnd a negative effect of the end of civil war
on trade. After the 4th year following an intervention, we observe a positive and signiﬁcant
effect of the intervention on the total imports of the target country (  GM is signiﬁcant). This
effectisnotalwayssigniﬁcantoverthe15years. Thecoefﬁcientofinterventioninvolvesmore
than a 10% increase in imports over the natural level. Diplomatic intervention partially com-
pensates for the negative effect of the end of conﬂict on imports.
The effect of diplomatic intervention on exports: the bilateral effect on exports (  bilX) is also
never signiﬁcant. The intervener does not import more from the target country than from










11other countries. Figure 5 represents the effect of intervention on the exports of the target
country (  GX). This effect is positive and signiﬁcant after the 5th year following the interven-
tion. The values of the coefﬁcients are larger than the coefﬁcients of imports. The coefﬁcient
induces a more than 30% increase in exports from the natural level. This persistent effect of
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Figure 5: The impact of diplomatic intervention and civil wars on exportations
5 Endogeneity issues
5.1 Correcting for omitted variables
A possible problem concerning our estimations is the omission of explanatory variables that
inﬂuencethedecisionbothtointerveneandtotrade. FollowingEichengreen and Irwin(1998)
we use lagged dependent variables of trade ﬂows to manage this omitted variable bias. To
control for the possibility that the decision to intervene in a country in a state of civil war de-
pends on previous trade, we re-estimate all the speciﬁcations adding one, two or three year
lagged bilateral trade ﬂows. Previous bilateral trade has a positive and signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on current trade. However, our results regarding diplomatic intervention are unaffected.9
9Results not shown here, but they are available upon request.
135.2 Reverse causality between trade and diplomatic intervention?
A topic that is connected to our study relates to the motivations of countries to intervene in
civil war. We need to address this question because there may be a reverse causality between
bilateral trade and diplomatic intervention. Does trade provide incentives to intervene? To
our knowledge, few studies have tackled this question.10 Greig and Regan (2009) show that
a third-party with no trade with civil war state is more likely to offer mediation to the civil
war than one with an average level of trade. The conﬁrmation of this result with our data
would contradict an intuitive, expected positive inﬂuence of trade on the choice to launch a
diplomaticintervention. Totestthispotentialendogeneityproblem, weestimatetheeffectof
imports and exports on the probability for each country i to intervene in country j involved
in civil war:
Proba(INTijt) = β0 + β1Mijt + β2Xijt + β3CONTij (10)
+β4CONTijt + β5CONTit + µij + ρt + εijt
The main variables of interest, Mijt and Xijt, are respectively import and export ﬂows
from i to j at time t. We use dyad variables (CONTijt) to denote diplomatic relationships
(United Nations votes, Military Alliances) and dyad variables invariant in time (CONTij) as
geographic proximity (Log distance, Contiguity) and historical linkages (common language,
ex-colony, common colony). We also control for some intervener characteristics (Log GDP,
military capability, democracy index) (CONTit).11
We restrict our sample such that the set of countries j are countries where civil war oc-
curred between 1960 and 1996. The results of the estimations are reported in Table 1. In
speciﬁcation (1) to (3) we use a logit speciﬁcation to predict the probability that a country
will intervene diplomatically in a civil war. In the ﬁrst regression, we ﬁnd that imports and
exports do not inﬂuence the intervention probability. In the second regression, we add con-
trol variables. Import and export ﬂows still show non-signiﬁcant effects, and the coefﬁcients
of the control variables have the expected signs: Geographical distance reduces the incentive
to intervene in a civil conﬂict whereas colonial linkages, military capabilities and the GDP
of potential interveners increase the probability of intervention. In regression (3) we employ
dyad ﬁxed effects and time dummies and a logit estimation procedure. This method forces
us to exclude countries that havenever experienced an intervention, which reducesour sam-
10See Greig and Regan (2009) for a recent survey on mediation in political science.
11See data sources in the appendix.
14ple dramatically. We next apply the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation procedure to
regressions (4) to (6). Whichever the speciﬁcation considered, import and export ﬂows have
non-signiﬁcant effects on the probability of intervention. These results are robust to other
controls and lags for imports and exports (results not shown here).12
We can propose several explanations for the non-signiﬁcant effect of import and export
on the probability of intervention. First, countries involved in civil war are generally small
countries in terms of world trade. Their share in the trade ﬂows of a potential intervener is
generally small. Second, main trading partners may not take part in the civil conﬂict because
intervention is risky and may fail to resolve it. If the intervener is suspected of defending
one of the parties involved in the conﬂict which subsequently is the loser, the winning party




but they support the transaction costs reduction hypothesis. This suggests that the positive
effect of diplomatic intervention is due to the enhancement of some trade-promoting capital
such as institutions, infrastructure rebuilding, trust,... following a diplomatic intervention.
12UnlikeGreig and Regan(2009),wedonotﬁndanegativeeffectoftradeontheprobabilityofintervention. Our
main variable of interest is level while they consider the proportion of the third party’s total imports and exports
traded with the target country.
15Table 1: Trade Effect on Intervention’s Probability
Speciﬁcation: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exportationijt 0.188 0.182 0.769 0.000643 0.000468 0.000658
(0.121) (0.169) (0.566) (0.000425) (0.000794) (0.000971)
Importationijt 0.0122 -0.187 -0.326 0.000146 -0.000539 -0.000281
(0.120) (0.164) (0.593) (0.000428) (0.000783) (0.000955)
Un Voteijt 0.159 1.741 -0.000186 0.00684
(0.463) (1.330) (0.00310) (0.00573)
Military Allianceijt -0.334 -1.659 1.13e-05 -0.00904
(0.362) (1.599) (0.00282) (0.00801)
Distanceij -1.247*** 7.373* -0.00553*** -0.00254
(0.216) (3.938) (0.00125) (0.0254)
Contiguityij -0.298 -0.679 0.00244 0.00640
(0.473) (4.304) (0.00375) (0.0790)
Comm. Languageij 0.466 4.435 0.00118 -0.00278
(0.325) (3.735) (0.00221) (0.0755)
Colonyij 1.558*** -13.49 0.0201*** 0.00652
(0.502) (9.162) (0.00557) (0.0819)
Common Colonyij 1.303*** -2.767 0.00825*** -8.22e-05
(0.423) (2.235) (0.00296) (0.0906)
Log GDPi 0.410*** 2.298 0.00103* 6.69e-05
(0.132) (1.410) (0.000610) (0.00323)
Militaries Capabilitiesi 16.76*** -85.70 0.210*** -0.317
(3.905) (69.34) (0.0308) (0.216)
Democracy Indexi -0.0296 0.0448 -3.21e-05 -0.000376
(0.0262) (0.143) (0.000128) (0.000294)
Observations 26365 9578 306 26365 9578 9578
R2 0.02 0.17 0.22 0.001 0.016 0.330
Estimation Method Logit Logit Logit OLS OLS OLS
Dyad ﬁxed effect no no yes no no yes
Time dummies no no yes no no yes
Note: Standard errors in parentheses with
,
 and
 respectively denoting signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
166 The institutional channel
In this section, we argue that institutions are a potential channel for the positive effect of
diplomatic intervention on trade. The literature on the aftermath to civil war shows that in-
stitutions are dramatically affected by such conﬂicts. Diplomatic, economic or military inter-
ventions affect war outcome in terms of civil war duration (Regan, 1996, 2002). Collier (2006)
argues that the intervener plays an important role in the institutional rebuilding of the target
country. Theintervenercanprovideinstitutionalalternativesandassistancefromskilledper-
sonnel. After civil war, the different parts share power and responsibility for institutional re-
building. The intervener plays go-between and often proposes institutional design solutions.
We refer to Acemoglu (2008), which deﬁnes institutions as ‘... rules, regulations, laws and
policiesthataffecteconomicincentivesandthustheincentivestoinvestintechnology,phys-
ical capital and human capital’(pp126). There is a large literature showing that institutional
quality matters for trade. Institutional levels and the institutional distance between trade
partners are major determinants of bilateral trade ﬂows. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002)
show that corruption and imperfect contract enforcement reduce imports. The index of bad
institutional quality (high degree of corruption, bad investment climate or inefﬁcient judi-
cial system) acts as a hidden tax on imports or increases the ﬁxed costs of entry (Levchenko,
2007). Institutions also inﬂuence specializations patterns (Berkowitz et al., 2006; Nunn, 2007;
Costinot, 2009). This literature shows that ‘good’ institutions are a source of comparative ad-
vantage and enable countries to produce and export more complex goods. According to the
prominence of institutions in trade ﬂows, we study the evolution of institutional quality fol-
lowing a diplomatic intervention in the light of historical illustrations and then provide new
evidence.
6.1 Historical illustrations
Diplomatic intervention in civil war not only affects the chances of a peace agreement, but
also leads to an improvement in the quality of the institutions in the target country, which,
in turn, increases the target country’s trade ﬂows with the rest of the world. In this section,
we discuss how diplomatic intervention in a civil war impacts on the target country’s institu-
tions, in the light of historical fact. Diplomatic interventions have an impact on the institu-
tions in the target country. Peace agreements ending civil wars are generally focused not only
on cease-ﬁre and non violence clauses, they also often include conditions about new institu-
17tions. We illustrate this argument using three different cases of intervention in civil wars in
Guatemala, Rhodesia and Yugoslavia.
After the diplomatic intervention of Spain, the civil war in Guatemala (1961-1996) ended
with a negotiated agreement signed by the leftist rebel leaders of the Unidad Revolucionaria
NacionalGuatemalteca(URNG)andgovernmentrepresentatives. In1996,ﬁvedifferentagree-
ments were signed: an agreement on social and economic, and agrarian aspects, an agree-
ment related to the strengthening of civilian power and the role of the armed forces in a
democratic society, an agreement to a deﬁnitive cease-ﬁre, an agreement on constitutional
reform and an electoral regime, and an agreement related to the legal integration of the
URNG.
Between 1976 and 1979, the US and Great Britain tried to implement the negotiation of a
peace agreement to end the civil war in Rhodesia (1971-1979). In 1979, the Lancaster House
Agreement ended this war following negotiations between representatives of the Patriotic
Front (PF) and the Zimbabwe Rhodesia government. The parties signed a single agreement
including the Independence Constitution, arrangements for the pre-independence period,
and a cease-ﬁre. The Independence Constitution included deﬁnition of the Republic state,
rule of citizenship, a declaration of liberty and property rights, deﬁnition of the Judicature,
governance of defence forces, and governance of public ﬁnance.
In Europe, the Balkan crises led to the end of the State of Yugoslavia. In 1995, the lead-
ers of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia signed the Dayton Peace Accords, which ofﬁcially ended
the wars in Bosnia (1992-1995) and Croatia (1991-1995). NATO troops entered Bosnia in 1995
in order to enforce and end to the ﬁghting. Diplomatic representatives of the US, Germany,
France, the UK and Russia enabled the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. This agree-
ment includes such detail as precise steps for the end to ﬁghting, deﬁnition of the geographic
boundaries between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, voting
rules for the next elections, and a new constitution.
These examples show that ending civil wars and promoting peace keeping is conducted
through agreement on a constitution that includes at least the holding of free and fair elec-
tions, the building of a judiciary system, the governance of public ﬁnance and the safeguard-
ing of liberty and property rights.
186.2 Results
We use seven different measures to analyze the effect of diplomatic intervention on institu-
tions. Our results are robust whatever institutional measure is used. We consider four mea-
sures from The PRS Group. The ﬁrst is an aggregate indicator, International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG), which includes data from 1984. This aggregate measure is broken down into
three others measures to account for economic, ﬁnancial and political institutions. We use
two indicators from Freedom House to reﬂect ‘civil liberties’ and ‘political rights’. Our third
institutional indicator source is the Fraser Institute. It provides a score for countries’ ‘regu-
lation’ of credit, labor and business. We are aware that these institutional measures do not
reﬂect North (1994)’s deﬁnition, nor do they take account of criticisms related to institutional
measures (Glaeser et al., 2004; Persson, 2005).13 We think these measures capture at least
some perception of the level of institutional quality and that variations in this perception can
affect trade.
Is the hypothesis of a positive link between intervention and quality of institutions con-
ﬁrmed by our data? Are institutions affected by diplomatic intervention? To answer these
questions, we follow the event-study methodology used by Chen et al. (2007). We consider
post-civil war countries and compare the evolution of their institutions in terms of quality,
between those countries targeted by diplomatic intervention and those which were not. Our
‘event time’ is the 10 years after the end of the civil war. The ﬁrst year after the end of war is
deﬁned as event year 1, the second year as event year 2, and so on. Since the number of years
for which data on institutions is available is not large, we restrict the ‘event’ duration to 10
years. We focus on the group of countries which experienced a civil war and were the target
ofadiplomaticintervention(WI).Weneedtwocontrolgroups. Theﬁrstgroupiscomposedof
countries that have never experienced civil war (P), which allows us to control for an increas-
ing world trend in the quality of institutions observed in the data. The second group is com-
posed of countries that suffered civil war, but received no diplomatic intervention (W). For
each of the two control groups, (P) and (W), for each year, and for each institutional variable,
we compute the median values of the institutional quality index, λP
t and λW
t , respectively. We
then compute the difference between the institutional quality in the country of interest, λWI
it ,







t . We estimate the three following equations separately
13North (1994) deﬁnes institutions as ‘... the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction’
19for each of the seven institutional measures:
λWI
it = αWI + βWIEndwarit + µWI
i + εit (11)
∆P
it = αP + βPEndwarit + µP
i + εit (12)
∆W
it = αW + βWEndwarit + µW
i + εit (13)
where Endwarit counts the number of years after the end of the civil war (from 1 to 10). Table
2 presents the results of the estimations.
Table 2: Post-War Trends on Institutions in Conﬂict Countries




it ) of countries
ICRG
Global 1.28(0.172) 0.74(0.14) 0.53(0.136) 225/25
Economic 0.48(0.115) 0.401(0.110) 0.155 (0.108) 229/25
Financial 0.914(0.135) 0.744(0.123) 0.51(0.114) 238/26
Political 1.515(0.205) 0.876(0.187) 0.941(0.183) 238/26
Freedom House
Civil Liberties 0.028(0.011) 0.037(0.014) 0.017 (0.012) 471/37
Political Rights 0.029(0.013) 0.034(0.013) 0.028(0.013) 471/37
Fraser
Regulation 0.051(0.020) 0.033(0.019) 0.041(0.021) 97/22
Note: Standard errors in parentheses with
,
 and
 respectively denoting signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
We observe that the trend for quality of institutions for group (WI),   βWI, is positive and
signiﬁcantwhatevertheinstitutionalmeasureconsidered(Column2). Theinstitutionalqual-
ity trend for countries that were the target of a diplomatic intervention (WI) relative to those
that were at peace (P),   βP, is positive and signiﬁcant (column 3). In other words, when we
control for improvement in the quality of institutions over time, we see that the trend for
quality of institutions for group (WI) is positive. Our main interest is the estimation compar-
ing group (WI) and group (W) (Column 4). We observe a positive trend,   βW, for almost all
20indices. Diplomatic intervention seems to have a positive effect on institutions in post-civil
war countries. This conclusion is additional proof of the important role played by diplomatic
intervention in the aftermath to civil war. It conﬁrms that diplomatic intervention enhances
some trade-promoting capital in the target country. It is also coherent with the positive ef-
fect of intervention on trade and the absence of a ‘bonus’ of increased bilateral trade with the
intervener.
7 Conclusion
This paper considered the effect of diplomatic intervention by a third country in civil war. We
have shown that diplomatic intervention affects the trade ﬂows of the countries involved in
the civil war: while trade levels generally fall in post-war countries, diplomatic intervention
has a positive effect on exports and imports of these countries. We have also shown that in-
tervener countries do not beneﬁt from a privileged trading relationship with target countries.
We argue that these effects are due to an enhancement of trade promoting capital and show
that diplomatic intervention has a positive effect on institutional quality in the target coun-
try. The institutional channel appears a plausible explanation for the effect of intervention
on trade.
21Appendix A: reverse causality between trade and diplomatic inter-
vention: data sources
As in the main part of the paper, bilateral trade (import and export) data come from IMF
DOTS augmented by Martin et al. (2008b). For the geographic variables we use the CEPII
bilateral distance database (www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm). The ‘Military
capabilities’ variable comes from Correlates of War (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/) and
is the mean of six country components: Energy consumption, Iron and Steel production,
Military expenditure, Military personnel, Total population, Urban population. The ‘Alliances’
variable also comes from Correlates Of War and is coded 1 if dyad shares a defensive, neutral-
ity, non-aggression or entente alliance at year t. The UN votes correlation annual database,
available for 1946 to 1996, is from Gartzke (http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/). The democ-
racy index is from the Polity IV database; it ranks each country on a -10 to +10 scale. Inter-
vener GDP is based on World Bank (World Development Indicator) completed by Barbieri
(2002).
22Table 3: Intervener and Target Countries
Intervener Target Country Year Intervener Target Country Year Intervener Target Country Year
U.k Cyprus 1963 Spain Guatemala 1987 Ghana Liberia 1995
USA Cyprus 1964 USA Ethiopia 1989 Nigeria Liberia 1995
U.k Cyprus 1964 France Cambodia 1989 Canada Sri lanka 1995
Sudan Ethiopia 1964 Thailand Myanmar 1989 Norway Sri lanka 1995
USA Dominican Rep. 1965 Zimbabwe Mozambique 1989 Netherlands Sri lanka 1995
Gabon Nigeria 1969 Kenya Mozambique 1989 USA Sudan 1995
Switzerland Nigeria 1969 USA Sudan 1989 USA Burundi 1996
Libya Chad 1969 Norway Guatemala 1990 Russia Moldova 1996
Egypt Jordan 1970 USA Liberia 1990 Gabon Chad 1996
Somalia Uganda 1972 Italy Mozambique 1990 Russia Tajikistan 1996
U.k Cyprus 1974 USA Ethiopia 1991 Gabon Congo 1997
Zambia Zimbabwe 1974 USA Liberia 1991 Zaire Congo 1997
Sudan Ethiopia 1975 Italy Mozambique 1991 USA U.k 1997
Indonesia Philippines 1975 Zaire Rwanda 1991 Russia Tajikistan 1997
Zambia Zimbabwe 1975 Nigeria Sudan 1991 Iran Tajikistan 1997
USA Lebanon 1976 Nicaragua El Salvador 1991 Tanzania Burundi 1998
Libya Lebanon 1976 Djibouti Somalia 1991 USA U.k 1998
Syria Lebanon 1976 Zimbabwe Mozambique 1992 Thailand Cambodia 1998
USA Zimbabwe 1976 Italy Mozambique 1992 Japan Cambodia 1998
U.k Zimbabwe 1976 Tanzania Rwanda 1992 France Yugoslavia 1998
USA U.k 1977 Nigeria Sudan 1992 USA Yugoslavia 1998
U.k Zimbabwe 1977 USA Somalia 1992 Italy Yugoslavia 1998
USA Zimbabwe 1977 USA Georgia 1993 Germany Yugoslavia 1998
Jordan Iran 1978 Spain Guatemala 1993 Uk Yugoslavia 1998
USA Lebanon 1978 Norway Guatemala 1993 South Africa Zaire 1998
France Lebanon 1978 Ukraine Moldova 1993 Egypt Sudan 1999
USA Nicaragua 1978 Tanzania Rwanda 1993 Canada Sudan 1999
Dominican Rep. Nicaragua 1978 Belgium Rwanda 1993 U.k Yugoslavia 1999
Guatemala Nicaragua 1978 Nigeria Sudan 1993 France Yugoslavia 1999
USA Zimbabwe 1978 Russia Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994 South Africa Zaire 1999
U.k Zimbabwe 1978 Russia Georgia 1994
U.k Zimbabwe 1979 Ghana Liberia 1994
Canada El Salvador 1981 USA Rwanda 1994
Mexico El Salvador 1982 Kenya Sudan 1994
India Sri lanka 1983 Iran Tajikistan 1994
France Chad 1983 Egypt Yemen 1994
Colombia El Salvador 1984 U.k South Africa 1994
USA El Salvador 1984 USA South Africa 1994
Congo Chad 1984 France Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995
India Sri lanka 1984 Germany Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995
Kenya Uganda 1985 Russia Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995
Spain Guatemala 1986 USA Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995
India Sri lanka 1986 U.k Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995
India Sri lanka 1987 USA U.k 1995
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